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BOOK REVIEWS
ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT. Prepared by the United
States Department of Justice. Leavenworth: Federal Prison Industries, Inc., Press, 1947. Pp. 139.
THE FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT
AND THE ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES. Vol. VII of
the New York University School of Law Institute Proceedings, 1947. Pp. viii, 630.
With the adoption of the Federal Administrative Procedure Act in June, 1946,1 the contentious subject of administrative law entered a new phase. For better or for worse,
the provisions of the new code become the starting point
for shaping the procedures of the agencies of the Federal
Government which issue regulations or orders or take action
having effects outside the Government. The Act will also
be the primary guide for the courts in passing upon the
methods of these agencies. It supersedes the legislation
establishing the agencies and conferring their functions upon
them, in so far as there is conflict; but it invokes that legislation upon some points, including the fundamental one of
when administrative hearings are and are not required.
The Act, while new, is built upon the foundation of
previous knowledge, experience, and discussion, notably the
report of the Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure. 2 It resembles most largely the bill proposed by the so-called "minority" of that Committee, 3 but
1.
2.

3.

60 Stat. 237, 5 U.S.C. §§1001-1011 (1946).
This report, a volume of 474 pages, rendered in 1941, was published initially by the Department of Justice and afterward as
Sen. Doc. No. 8, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (1941). It is now out of print.
Preparatory to the report and as a basis for it, the Committee's
Director and staff, on the basis of first-hand investigation and
study of documents, prepared 27 "Monographs" with regard to
the procedure of as many of the major federal agencies. These
were published as Sen. Doc. No. 186, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. (1940),
in 13 parts, and Sen. Doc. No. 10, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (1941),
in 14 parts. The parts, so far as still available, may be purchased separately from the Government Printing Office.
The Committee did not actually split into opposing groups. Its
report was unanimous, except that the "additional views" of
four members contained proposals for the reform of administrative procedure, particularly by legislation, going beyond those
advocated by the Committee as a whole. Such of the Committee's
recommendations as called for legislation were embodied in a bill
(362)
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its terms are the result of long-continued subsequent deliberation. Essentially, the Act as it stands represents an adjustment between the proposals of lawyers wishing to attach
procedural safeguards to the processes of Federal agencies
bearing upon, private interests 4 and considerations advanced
by the representatives of those agencies in order to safeguard the effectiveness of the work required of them by
Congress. Thq present Act was introduced as S.7 and H.R.
1203, 79th Congress, 1st Session, and underwent a process
of revision in the committees of both houses as a result of
suggestions from the administrative agencies, which the
Senate Committee on the Judiciary invited, and of conferences in which representatives of the Attorney General, reflecting the views of the Executive Branch, and private
parties both participated.5 The resulting measure was
adopted unanimously in both houses. 6
Because of the process of evolution through which the
new Act passed before its adoption, it contains provisions
with doubtful meaning. Problems of interpretation here
spring not only from the inevitable difficulty of construing
words of broad import in a general enactment, but also from
the somewhat novel devices employed to accomodate opposing points of view. Consequently, despite the Act's foundation in previous experience, the lawyer who wishes to understand it must conduct his study with some freedom from
proposed by what has since been called the "majority." More
far-reaching proposals of three members of the "minority" were
embodied in a separate bill which they offered. Both bills were
introduced in the 77th Congress at the 1st Session. After hearings upon them and a third bill, conducted by a sub-committee
of the Senate Judiciary Committee (77th Cong., 1st Sess., Hearings on S. 674, S. 675 and S. 918, April 2 to July 2, 1941), the
matter of administrative procedure legislation was pushed aside
by World War II.
4. A number of administrative procedure bills and bills providing
for an administrative court to review agencies' acts were introduced in Congress, beginning in 1935. The most significant of
these emanated from the American Bar Association's Special
Committee on Administrative Procedure, established in 1933.
An enumeration of them and an account of their relation to
the Act may be found in Sen. Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong., 2d
Sess., 188 (1946), and in 31 A.B.A.J. 615 (1945). These bills
formed the principal channel through which the practicing bar's
ideas as to the reform of administrative procedure were brought
to bear. The Bar Association afterward endorsed the bill proposed by the minority of the Attorney General's Committee.
66 A.BA.Rep. 401-404 (1942).
5. See Sen. Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong., 2d Sess., 190-191, 394 (1946).
6. Id. at 344, 406, 423.
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previous concepts and with strict attention to the Act's
own terminology.
The Act, in brief, provides for six major aspects of
the functioning of federal administrative agencies: (1) the
publication in the Federal Register by all agencies, whether
or not subject to the Act's remaining provisions, of accounts
of their organization, course and method of performing
their functions, and substantive general rules, except such
matters as relate solely to internal -management or must
be kept secret in the public interest;7 (2) the conduct of
rule-making proceedings by agencies with opportunity for
interested persons to participate by petitioning for changes
and by submitting data, views, or arguments;8 (3) certain
"ancillary" procedural points, such as the right to appear
by counsel, to have matters disposed of by agencies "with
reasonable dispatch," etc. ;9 (4) the conduct of rule-making
and adjudicatory proceedings, in so far as required by other
statutes to produce rules or determinations based "on the
record after opportunity for an agency hearing," in accordance with specific requirements laid down; 10 (5) judicial
review of agency action;" and (6) protection to the independence and status of examiners to be used by the agen2
cies in the conduct of hearings.
A considerable body of literature surrounding the Act
has already come into existence. Some of it is more useful
for research into the legislative history of the Act and for
light upon the meaning of particular provisions than it is
for an understanding of the measure as a whole. 3 Some
7. Section 3. This section also requires opinions and orders to be

8.

9.
10.

published or made available to public inspection and official
records to be made available to parties concerned, except "information held confidential for good cause found."
Section 4. The section does not apply, for the most part, to
interpretative or procedural rules. Military, naval, and foreign
affairs functions, together with certain others, are excepted
altogether from this and the other principal sections of the Act,
except that relating to judicial review.

Section 6.
Sections 4, 5, 7, 8.

11. Section 10.
12. Section 11.
13. The derivation of the Act, its text, and its legislative history
in the 79th Congress are given in Sen. Doe. No. 248, 79th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1946), nn. 4, 5, 6, supra, a pamphlet of 458 pages

compiled by the Senate Committee on the Judiciary and obtainable from the Government Printing Office for 500. The document
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of it is laudatory or critical in nature,14 rather than expository from a practical standpoint. Some of it, on the other
hand, is designed primarily to aid lawyers within the Government and outside in the initial task of understanding
the Act and in the further task of making it work as
smoothly as possible. No piece of writing that has as yet
appeared has succeeded, however, in simplifying the Act's
structure or the content of its provisions. 5 When these have
been mastered in a general way from the Act itself, aid may
be derived from a well-written text which throws light on
the meaning of some of the more cryptic provisions by
reference to their history and to the purposes they were
designed to meet. The tivo works here under review probably afford the best available means of such study of the
effect of the Act's provisions.
The Attorney General's Manual is a running commentary upon the Act, section by section, which enlarges upon
the meaning and practical consequences of the several provisions from the point of view of government administrators attempting to comply with its requirements. As the
Attorney General's introduction states, the Manual was written in the Office of the Assistant Solicitor General, which
played a large part on behalf of the Attorney General in
the drafting of the Act, in order to afford guidance to the
various federal administrative agencies. It is now made
generally available because of great public demand for it.
The New York University volume consists of the proceedings of an institute conducted by that institution's School
of Law in February, 1947, at which addresses by 22 dif-

14.
15.

includes successive prints of the Act, the committee reports in
both houses (Sen. Rep. No. 752; H. R. Rep. No. 1980), the
discussions on the floor of Congress, and as an appendix to the
Senate report, a detailed commentary by the Attorney General
upon the Act which is also printed as an appendix to the Attorney General's Manual here under review.
Cohen, "Legislative Injustice and the Supremacy of Law" 26
Neb. L. Rev. 323 (1947), is highly critical. Much material in
the American Bar Association Journal has been laudatory.
An excellent account of the Act in the light of its history and
purposes is Nathanson, "The Administrative Procedure ActSome Comments" 41 Ill. L. Rev. 368 (1946). Other good accounts are Brown, "The Federal Administrative Procedure Act"
[1947] Wis. L. Rev. 66, and Note, "Federal Administrative Procedure Act-Codification or Reform?" 56 Yale L. J. 670 (1947).
A summary of the Act and commentary upon it, 32 A.B.A.J. 377
(1946), is brief, clear, and informative.
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ferent speakers, followed by discussion from the floor, occupied sessions on eight successive days.
The New York University addresses fall into three categories: those that deal with the history, -purposes, and
underlying theory of the Administrative Procedure Act;
those that discuss the general aspects of the Act; and the
larger number that deal with the effects of the Act upon
the procedure of specific agencies. In the first category
belong Dean Vanderbilt's discussion of the legislative background of the Act, opening the proceedings, and two analyses and appraisals of the Act as a whole, one of which is
contributed by Carl McFarland, chairman of the American
Bar Association's Committee on Administrative Law from
1941 to 1946, and the other by Dr. Frederick F. Blatchly,
the Brookings Institution's well-known writer on the subject of administrative procedure. The second category of
contributions mentioned above, which closes the volume,
consists of a discussion of rule-making under the administrative procedure act, by David Reich of the Office of the
Assistant Solicitor General, who is also one of the two
principal compilers of the Attorney General's Manual; a
discussion of adjudication under the Act by Ashley Sellers,
who as Special Assistant to the Attorney General guided
the Government's participation in the preparation of the
Act in its final stages; and a discussion of the judicial
review provisions of the act by John Dickinson, well-known
lawyer and student of administrative law. Between the
two groups of general discussions just mentioned are 14
talks with reference to the effects of the Act upon as many
different agencies. These are the Federal Communications
Commission, the Civil Aeronautics Board, the Bureau of
Internal Revenue, the Federal Power Commission, the Post
Office Department, the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Patent Office, the Immigration and Naturalization
Service, the Interstate Commerce Commission, the Department of Agriculture, the Federal Security Agency's Food
and Drug Division, the Federal Trade Commission, the Department of Labor, and the National Labor Relations Board.
Most of the discussions of specific agencies are contributed
by members of their several law offices; but three are
given by agency administrators who are also lawyers and
three are contributed by private practitioners having experience with the agencies in question.
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Although these discussions of the Administrative Procedure Act's impact upon specific agencies are useful for
study of those agencies and reveal significant implications
of the Act, they are less valuable in the initial attempt to
understand the Act's provisions than the more general ones,
particularly the final three by Messrs. Reich, Sellers, and
Dickinson. The three concluding essays should, therefore,
be read first by one who, having studied the Act itself, 16
wishes to pursue its meaning further. These may be followed by the first three discussions contributed by Messrs.
Vanderbilt, McFarland, and Blatchly, for the purpose of
obtaining critical views which find reflection in the subsequent discussions of particular agencies. If these discussions are read later with general considerations in mind,
study of the volume will probably attain its maximum
usefulness for the lawyer.
It may be remarked in passing that the discussions of
particular agencies in the New York University volume
are not designed to acquaint the reader with the procedures
of those agencies. For that purpose the agencies' rules of
practice, to be found in the Code of Federal Regulations,' 7
are the primary source material. In their present form they
franslate the requirements of the Administrative Procedure
Act, along with those of the specific statutes governing the
agencies, into precise codes. The New York University
essays are in effect commentaries upon how this has been
done, which assume a knowledge on the reader's part of the
general outlines of agency procedure. They are, naturally,
of uneven thoroughness and quality; but they are worth
perusing. Slight ambiguity regarding the Act occasionally
enters into the discussions, for which the reader must be
on his guard.:"
16.

Each of the volumes here under review contains the text of the
Act in an appendix.
17. They are usually also obtainable in convenient form from the
agencies themselves. The descriptive material with regard to
the organization, functions, and procedures of all of the federal
agencies, which was required to be published by §3 of the Act,
originally appeared as a 966-page supplement to the Federal
Register of September 11, 1946, and has been supplemented from
time to time since then. It is now available in the 1946 supplement to the Code of Federal Regulations, in 6 volumes, which
adds sub-chapters dealing with these topics to the original Code.
18. For example, on pp. 207-209 occurs a discussion in regard to
the Act's application to proceedings on the Post Office Department at the start of which it is stated that certain provisions
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Turning now to the more detailed contributions of the
publications here under review to the study of the Administrative Procedure Act as a whole, one may note first
that the Attorney General's Manual is generally more thorough in its treatment than the symposium material. Since
it has been prepared from a government viewpoint, its
interpretations differ in a number of instances from those
of other commentators, as is brought out in detail below.
If these instances of possible doubt are kept in mind, the
Attorney General's text can be used as a safe guide. It has
been ably, and on the whole objectively, prepared. Although
so technical a discussion can hardly be expected to make
exciting reading, it touches upon live issues at numerous
points; and to one who has followed the controversies and
problems to which administrative procedure has given rise
during the past quarter-century, the Manual's statement
of the results which the Act achieves in these matters possesses a high degree of interest.
As Mr. Reich in particular makes clear in his contribution to the symposium, 19 and as the Manual brings out
in greater detail in an introductory portion entitled "Fundamental Concepts," the procedural provisions of the Act are
built upon a "dichotomy between rule-making and adjudication." This is reflected not only in the separate provisions
of Section 4 for rule-making in general and of Section 5
for "formal" adjudication,20 but also in specific differentiations which are made by Sections 7 and 8 between "formal" rule-making 2' and "formal" adjudication, to both of
which the two sections apply. Rule-making and adjudication
apply to such proceedings when the governing statute requires
a hearing. Not until the conclusion of the discussion does it
appear that this is true only because the hearing requirement

has been construed to include the requirement of decision upon
the record of the hearing. On page 359 the statement is made
that the Act requires milk marketing orders to be made on the
basin of a proceeding having the same characteristics as "adver-

19.

20.
21.

sary or quasi-judicial proceedings." The statement is true in a
general sense; but the reader must be wary not to understand
it as an assertion that the milk marketing procedure is required
to lie the same as the procedure in "adjudications" under the
Act. There are important differences, as will appear.
The same paper is published in slightly condensed form in 33

A.B.A.J. 315 (1947).
I.e., "adjudication required by the statute to be determined on the
record after opportunity for an agency hearing."
I.e., rule-making subject to the same requirement as that stated
for formal adjudication in n.20.
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are not defined in the Act according to conventional understanding, however. The former embraces not only the formulation of general regulations but also "any agency statement of . . . particular applicability and future effect,"
and includes specifically "the approval or prescription for
the future of rates, wages, corporate or financial structures
or reorganizations thereof, prices, facilities, appliances,
services or allowances therefor or of valuations, costs, or
accounting, or practices bearing upon any of the foregoing."
"Adjudication" is defined as the formulation of "the
whole or any part of the final disposition ... of any agency
in any matter other than rule-making . ... " Since the
definition of rule-making is as broad as it is, one experiences difficulty at first glance in perceiving what types
of administrative proceedings are left as adjudication. This
problem crops up at a number of points in the New York
University Institute discussions; but Mr. Reich, followed
by Mr. Sellers, makes the matter as clear as it can become.
There exists in fact, on the basis of a sound interpretation
of the Act, a large area of formal adjudication, which embraces the cease-and-desist orders of the Federal Trade
Commission, the National Labor Relations Board, and a
number of other agencies, together with decisions upon
money claims and many varieties of license revocation and
modification proceedings.
The most significant procedural differences between
formal rule-making and formal adjudication under the Act
are those relating to the "separation of functions." In formal adjudication, except in determining applications for initial licenses, the examiner who conducts the hearing may
not "consult any person or party on any fact in issue unless

upon notice and opportunity for all parties to participate ;,,22
nor may any officer, employee or agent "who has performed
investigative or prosecuting functions for the agency in that
or a factually related case participate or advise in the decision except as witness or counsel in public proceedings."'8'
In a formal adjudication, moreover, with the same exception
in initial license proceedings, the examiner must either
decide the case in the first instance or recommend a deci-

22. Section 5(c). This provision does not apply if one or more
agency heads preside, instead of an examiner.
23. Ibid.
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sion to the agency heads who are to decide

it.24

These re-

quirements do not attach to formal rule-making as defined
above, including many proceedings of the Interstate Commerce Commission, Federal Power Commision, and Department of Agriculture. The adoption of the broadened definition of rule-making which exempts these proceedings,
together with the exclusion of initial licensing from the
same requirements, constituted the Great Compromise in
the formulation of the Act. As Mr. Reich and the Manual
bring out, the "dichotomy" thus established is founded upon
realistic considerations; for, by and large, rule-making as
now defined embraces those proceedings in which the documentary nature of most of the evidence, the technical character of the issues, and the policy considerations that enter
into the decisions make it desirable for all the resources
of agency staffs to be brought to bear upon the proceedings
and correspondingly diminish the relative importance of the
examiner's contribution. In adjudication as the Act now
leaves it, on the other hand, the role of the examiner who
has heard the witnesses is relatively more important; and
the frequently "accusatory" nature of the proceedings calls
for greater safeguards to the impartiality of the tribunal.
In order to further the impartiality of the examiner
and to increase the adequacy and dignity of the oral hearing, the Act frees the examiners within an agency who
participate in adjudication of supervision and direction
by staff members "engaged in the performance of investigative or prosecuting functions" for the agency, thus virtually requiring that they be maintained as a separate corps.
The protections to the independence and status of examiners, previously mentioned, which the Act provides, go
far beyond those accorded to members of the competitive
civil service generally; for an examiner may be removed
by his agency only for good cause, after opportunity for
formal hearing and approval by the Civil Service Commission. 25- The powers which the examiners enjoy in connection
with hearings include the power to issue subpoenas if the
24. Sections 5(c), 8(a).
25. Sections 11, 5(2). Government employees in the competitive civil
service, contrary to the general impression, are removable for
causes deemed sufficient by the employing agencies, with only
such procedural protection as is afforded by the right to a
written statement of charges and an opportunity to reply in
writing. 37 stat. 555 (1912), 5 U.S.C. §652 (1940).
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agency itself has subpoena powers, 26 thus eliminating any
doubt concerning delegation of the function of issuing subpoenas for hearing purposes.
The separation-of-functions provision which precludes
consultation outside the hearing with any person on any
fact in issue gives rise to differences of interpretation.
These involve, first, the meaning of "fact in issue" and of
consultation and, second, the classes of persons embraced
by the prohibition. As to the former, Mr. Sellers takes the
extreme position that the examiner is precluded "from consulting with anyone about the case" and may not use clerical or accounting assistance in compiling monetary totals
28
from the evidence.27 The Manual
states that the examiner
"is prohibited from obtaining or receiving evidentiary or
factual information bearing on the issues," including expert
testimony. As worded, the provision does not seem to prohibit consultation with regard to issues of law or policy.
As to the persons who may not be consulted, an independent commentator has suggested that members of agency
staffs are not embraced within the prohibition ;29 but this
is a claim which is not reflected in the Manual or in the
contributions to the New York University symposium.
With regard to the fundamental line between rulemaking and adjudication, doubts and differences also arise.
Mr. Wanner gives illustrations in his discussion of the Civil
Aeronautics Board. 30 A critical issue, also, is whether applications for the enlargement of licenses, such as extensions
of routes for carriers or of time of operation of radio stations, are "applications for initial licenses" and consequently
free of the separation-of-functions requirements above enumerated, or whether they give rise to adjudications in the
strict sense. Mr. Caldwell, criticising the regulations of the
Federal Communications Commission, 3 ' takes the latter position; Mr. Ross, speaking for the Federal Power Commission'22
and the Manual3 state the contrary.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

Section 7(b).
Symposium, 544-545.
P. 54.
Nathanson, "The Administrative Procedure Act-Some Comments" 41 Ill. L. Rev. 368, 387-390 (1946).
Symposium, 123-125.
Id. at 98-101.
Id. at 184-185.
Pp. 51-53. The discussion in the Manual adduces reasons in
the legislative history and policy of the Act.

372
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Mr. Dickinson's discussion of judicial review carefully
analyzes the Act's provisions. Here again examination of
the Act's terms is essential to their understanding, and
conclusions cannot be free of all doubt. A reading of Section
10, which is the judicial review provision, might lead to the
conclusion that the Act subjects all administrative determinations, without exception, to some form of judicial
review. Mr. Dickinson's discussion discloses that this is
not correct. Previous statutes, such as that governing the
allowance of veterans' benefits, and judicial interpretations,
such as those given to some provisions of the Railway
Labor Act, still stand and specifically preclude judicial review. Equal difficulty of interpretation is presented by
provisions of the Act which appear to affect the scope
of judicial review of administrative action. Section 7(c)
provides that "no sanction shall be imposed or rule or order
be issued" in proceedings in which action is required to be
upon the administrative record, "except . . . as supported
by and in accordance with the reliable, probative and substantial evidence." Section 10(e) requires a reviewing court
to "hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and
conclusions found to be . . . without observance of procedure required by law or unsupported by substantial evidence in any case subject to the requirements" of Section
7. It can be argued that, as regards evidence points, a reviewing court might set aside agency action on the ground
of procedural error where the action or the underlying
findings and conclusions appeared not to be "supported by
and in accordance with" what the court deems to be the
reliable, probative and substantial evidence, judged upon
its merits. The Attorney General's Manual 34 flatly denies
that any such conclusion can legitimately be drawn. Standard practice prior to the Administrative Procedure Act
limited the possibility of judicial reversal on evidence
grounds to lack of substantiality in the supporting evidence;
and the Manual cites clear legislative history to the effect
that the Act was intended simply to incorporate "a general
codification of the substantial evidence rule which, either
by statute or judicial rule, has long been applied to the review of Federal administrative action." Mr. Dickinson does
not negative this conclusion. He does, however, draw from
4. Pp. 76, 109,
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the history and purpose of the Act a conclusion which, he
asserts, requires a reviewing court to judge the substantiality of the evidence supporting administrative action in
the light of other relevant evidence contained in the record
as a whole, rather than in disassociation from other evidence. Much is said on this point in the discussion following Mr. Dickinson's paper 35 and that of Mr. Reilly with
regard to the National Labor Relations Board. 36 But, as
has been said, the problem of what the Act really provides
and of its practical effect in this regard, if any, depends
upon the past practice of judges in reading administrative
records and "is such a subtle one that it is practically impossible to appraise the significance of these statutory provisions in the abstract.23

More important, perhaps, than the controversial questions just reviwed are the Administrative Procedure Act's
provisions for informal adjustment of proceedings, 38 for
participation of interested parties in informal rule-making, S°
and for public information as to agency organization and
processes. 40 Administrative agencies are, after all, set up
primarily to get public business done fairly and efficiently,
without controversy. That is the way they function in all
but a small portion of their business. If lawyers and the
interested public can find out how to take up a matter with
an agency and get it disposed of satisfactorily, they need
be correspondingly little concerned with the mechanism
for adversary proceedings. Study of the works here reviewed and of other literature, which necessarily are directed
largely to the more controversial matters, 41 should not be
permitted to obscure this truth. A sampling of the descriptive matter published by the agencies in the 1946 Supplement to the Code of Federal Regulations, in response to
35. Symposium, 591-598.
36. Id. at 485-489.
37. Nathanson, "The Administrative Procedure Act--Some Comments" 41 Ill. L. Rev. 368, 417 (1946).
38. Section 5(b).
39. See n.8 supra.
40. See n.7 supra.
41. The reflections of earlier controversy, as well as much information about the Act, emerge in the contributions of Messrs. Vanderbilt, McFarland, and Blatchly to the New York University
volume. These are interesting and cast light upon some of the
practical issues that remain; but their significance, one hopes,
will diminish as time goes on.
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the requirement of Section 3 of the Act, will emphasize
the extent to which informal dealings may be conducted
with the Government that centers in Washington.
RALPH F. FUCHS*
A NATIONAL POLICY FOR THE OIL INDUSTRY. By
Eugene V. Rostow., New Haven: Yale University Press.
1948. Pp. xvi, 173. $2.50.
One of the large modern buildings in Washington, D. C.
is the Standard Oil Building, located part way between the
Capitol and the White House. If it does not house a formal
branch of the Government, from it has nevertheless emanated a powerful influence on our national affairs, foreign
and domestic. 2 Professor Rostow's book, however, is not
so broad as its title would indicate. "A National Policy for
the Oil Industry" is concerned with the organization of the
industry, the economic effects of that organization, and
the cure for the economic ills resulting therefrom. Basically, it is an amply documented indictment for violation of
the antitrust laws of the major oil companies, the
oil-producing states, and the Department of the Interior.
Professor Rostow's Brandeisian premise is that it is
"easier to achieve the values of democracy in a society
where economic power and social prestige are more widely
distributed, and less concentrated, than in the United States
today." 3 It follows that if the oil industry could be made
to fit a more competitive pattern of organization, without
loss of the economic and social values that its present
structure affords, action should be taken to adapt the in*

Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law. Member
of U.S. Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure, 1938-41.

1.

Professor of Law, Member of the Graduate Faculty of Economics,
Yale University.
2. See, e.g., Tarbell, "History of the Standard Oil Company" (1904);
Nevins, "John D. Rockefeller: The Heroic Age of American Enterprise" (1940); Feis, "Petroleum and American Foreign Policy"
(1944); Feis, "Seen From E.A." 93-192 (1947); Schuman, "International Politics" 280-81 (2d ed. 1937); New York Post, Feb.

27, 1948, p. 6; Hearings before H. R. Committee on Judiciary on
Charges against the Attorney-General, 67th Cong., 2d Sess. (1922);

Hearings before Senate Committee Investigating the AttorneyGeneral, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. (1923).

3. Rostow, "A National Policy for the Oil Industry" xiii (1948).

